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Social Solidarity and Herbert
Spencer: Not the Oxymoron That
Might Be Assumed
John Offer*
School of Applied Social and Policy Sciences, Ulster University, Coleraine, United Kingdom
This article attempts to retrieve important aspects of Spencer’s sociology from the
general neglect and misrepresentation which threatens to overwhelm it all. It does
touch in passing on many such highly dubious contentions as that he was a “social
Darwinist,” but the prime focus is to deal with three linked themes. First, the article
examines the significance of his attribution to individuals of “social self-consciousness”
as part of sociality, thus distancing it from Durkheim’s influential but suspect reading of
Spencer’s individuals as egoistic. Second, it rescues his concept of “the social organism”
from misinterpretation. His own writings show it to be a more rigorous and suggestive
attempt to configure the morphology of “the social” than commonly assumed. Third, it
reconstructs the status of his contrast between “militant” and “industrial” social forms as
a contrast between different but more general forms of social life that those descriptions
in fact register. With the focus on these three linked themes the article improves the
historical accuracy of our understanding of Spencer’s sociology. It also repositions key
aspects of it as not alien, quaint and a spent force, but ontologically challenging and
possibly prescient for debates about the meaning of “the social” today.
Keywords: Herbert Spencer, social self-consciousness, social organicism, spontaneous cooperation, Emile
Durkheim, militant and industrial societies, solidarity
INTRODUCTION
For a long time, some critics have accused Spencer of writing things which in fact he did not write.
With justice it has been said that “many find it unnecessary any longer to read Spencer’s works in
order to pretend to ‘know’ his social philosophy” (McCann, 2004, p. 95). So this article at the start
will have to “bracket off” some stigmatizing assumptions that the name Spencer probably conjures
up. One respected senior sociologist, not alone, has told us that Spencer was a “social Darwinist”
and a “spent force,” a sociologist who worked with an unexamined “survival of the fittest” idea
(Crow, 2005, pp. 67, 181)1. I will touch in passing on many such highly dubious contentions.
However, the overriding aim of this discussion is to retrieve Spencer’s conception of “the social.”
And to get there we have to be clear about his conception of “the individual.” The first section
of this article is on the “individual” and the “social” in Spencer, distancing it from Durkheim’s
reading of Spencer. The second section restores to view the picture of what he saw as the core of
the “social organism” model, and the third rescues his “militant”/”industrial” distinction about
the types of social relations from interpretative disarray. The final section suggests that this retrieval
1The book by the polemical historian of ideas Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (1944) did damage
to Spencer’s name by describing his thought as “social Darwinism.” On the different and serious levels of misrepresentation
involved see Hodgson (2006), Taylor (2007, pp. 148–150), Leonard (2009), and Offer (2014). On the broader critical reception
of Spencer’s work, see Offer (2000).
Offer Social Solidarity and Herbert Spencer
exercise has a positive role to play in current and cross-
disciplinary debates about conceptualizing and researching “the
social” today.
THE “INDIVIDUAL” AND THE “SOCIAL”
First, Spencer must be defended against the common claim
that he was an “atomic individualist,” meaning that he denied
reality to something called social life beyond regarding it as
reduced to the aggregate of individual activities. Thus for
R.S. Peters, Spencer’s proposals on education were warped by
“atomic individualism” (Peters, 1981/2015, p. 71), while earlier
criticisms of Spencer (basically idealist in nature) fromDurkheim
highlighted what he believed to be his “narrow utilitarianism and
utilitarian egoism” (given in Lukes, 1969, p. 20). For Durkheim,
Spencer’s thought was equated with “moral poverty”: “it is
only too clear that all social life would be impossible if there
did not exist interests superior to the interests of individuals,”
while essentially the same claims were commonly leveled against
Spencer by idealist social thinkers such as Ritchie from the late
1870s (den Otter, 1996, pp. 92–98; 151–152). However, given the
large influence of Durkheim on sociology, it is on his particular
associated interpretation of Spencer that this article focuses.
This part of the discussion begins with an outline of the
chief relevant comments made by Durkheim on Spencer in
some of his main publications. In his The Division of Labor
in Society of 1893, Durkheim, addressing Spencer by name,
argues that “we should not, as does Spencer, present social life
as the mere resultant of individual natures alone, since, on the
contrary, it is rather the latter that emerge from the former.
Social facts are not the mere development of psychological
facts, which are for the most part only the prolongation of
social facts within the individual consciousness” (Durkheim,
2014/1893, p. 272). According to Durkheim, “Collective life did
not arise from individual life; on the contrary, it is the latter
that emerged from the former. On this condition alone can
we explain how the personal individuality of social units was
able to form and grow without causing society to disintegrate.
Indeed, since in this case it developed from within a pre-existing
social environment, it necessarily bears its stamp” (Durkheim,
2014/1893, p. 218). Durkheim enlarges on this point a few pages
later, remarking that it is “doubtless a self-evident truth that
there is nothing in social life that is not in the consciousness
of individuals. Yet everything to be found in the latter comes
from society” (Durkheim, 2014/1893, pp. 272–273). By way
of completing his argument he adds, in a Note, “But because
individuals form a society, new phenomena occur whose cause
is association, and which, reacting upon the consciousness of
individuals, for the most part shapes them. This is why, although
society is nothing without individuals, each one of them is much
more a product of society than he is the author” (Durkheim,
2014/1893, p. 274).
In his The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), Durkheim in
essence maintains his position on Spencer. Durkheim declares
that while Spencer sees social life as “essentially spontaneous
and society is a natural thing,” when he calls social life “natural”
this is simply because he finds a basis for it “in the nature of
the individual” (Durkheim, 2013/1895, p. 97). While individual
consciousnesses follow from the nature of the organic and
psychical being taken in isolation, what Durkheim refers to as
“collective consciousnesses” follows from the “combination of
a plurality of beings of this kind.” Thus the results “cannot
therefore fail to be different, since the component parts differ
to this extent” (Durkheim, 2013/1895, p. 99). Indeed, with
his reading of Spencer in mind, Durkheim’s identification
of the ontological reality of a collective consciousness takes
him into judgmental territory: there is a constraint that is
“normal” associated with “reflection which causes man to
understand how much richer or more complex and permanent
the social being is than the individual being,” revealing to
him “reasons to make comprehensible the subordination which
is required of him” and for the feelings of “attachment and
respect which habit has implanted within him” (Durkheim,
2013/1895, p. 98).
Note also that in Durkheim’s “Individualism and the
Intellectuals” of 1898 he makes a marked contrast between the
“egoism” of Spencer’s analysis and the social nature of the analysis
provided by Kant: “No one has insisted more emphatically than
Kant on the supra-individual character of morality and law”
(given in Lukes, 1969, p. 22, also reprinted in Hamilton, 1990).
We find too the emphasis on the supra-individual character of
the social reoccurring in 1917:
human societies present a new phenomenon of a special nature,
which consists in the fact that certain ways of acting are imposed,
or at least suggested from outside the individual and are added
on to his own nature: such is the character of the ‘institutions’
(in the broad sense of the word) which the existence of language
makes possible, and of which language itself is an example. They
take on substance as individuals succeed each other without
this succession destroying their continuity; their presence is
the distinctive characteristic of human societies, and the proper
subject of sociology (given in Durkheim, 2013/1895, p. 190).
Given Durkheim’s sentiments as outlined here (which are largely
consonant with more general modes of idealist social thought),
there is indeed room for thinking that while markets and the
division of labor “clearly require a degree of trust, institutional
guarantees, and regulation” in order to be stable over time,
Durkheim has overstated the case “in claiming that they require
an inclusive moral community” (see, for example, Lukes, 2014, p.
xxvii). However, the actual criticism advanced here is in essence
more specific in focus, namely that Spencer’s own thought has
been misunderstood by Durkheim. In a nutshell, Durkheim
was incorrect as a matter of fact when he described Spencer’s
sociology as exhibiting (as Durkheim himself wrote), a “narrow
utilitarianism and utilitarian egoism,” and “moral poverty,” giving
as a reason for his statement that “it is only too clear that all social
life would be impossible if there did not exist interests superior to
the interests of individuals” (in Lukes, 1969, p. 20). The absence
of a collective consciousness for Durkheim entails that there
can be no norms governing contract, thus basic egoism cannot
produce what is social: “a set of rules cannot function properly
if it is not accepted by the individuals and . . . this acceptance is
incompatible with a basic egoism” (Steeman, 1963, p. 65). Social
life entails solidarity, which entails altruism. Altruism is the basis
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2019 | Volume 4 | Article 1
Offer Social Solidarity and Herbert Spencer
of social life, not an ornament to it. Thus, for Durkheim, “no real
social order would be possible if the individual were really the
kind of egoist Spencer makes him to be” (Steeman, 1963, p. 65).
If there is a social order present, this fact goes to show that the
individual cannot be purely egoistic. Thus it is impossible that
the “individualizing trend in social evolution” can foster the type
of society which Spencer had in mind, “a harmony of egoisms”
(Steeman, 1963, p. 65).
However, the reality is that for Spencer each person was
capable of possessing a “social self-consciousness” and a
“chivalry” (“The morals of trade,” Spencer, 1859, pp. 140–
141). His The Study of Sociology of 1873, a popular, influential,
and a pioneering overall account of the subject, argued that
as well as a rounded individual self-consciousness formed in
each person in society, each person must develop a rounded
impression of his or her society: “A well-balanced social self-
consciousness, like a well-balanced individual self-consciousness,
is the accompaniment of a high evolution” (Spencer, 1873, p.
291). Spencer saw our self-consciousness of others as an essential
constituent of “society,” or “the social organism2.”
In addition, in Spencer’s three-volume Principles of Sociology,
published between 1876 and 1896, he observed that from
the point of which “a combination of men acquires some
permanence, there begin actions and reactions” between each
member of it and the community itself, such that “either affects
the nature of the other” (Spencer, 1877, pp. 12–13)3. Social
cooperation, indeed, begins by joint defense and offense, and
out of these cooperations “all kinds of cooperations have arisen”
(Spencer, 1891, p. 241). For Spencer, the presence of cooperation
may be understood as a sign that, in terms of psychological
adaptation, ego-altruistic sentiments were emerging through
gregarious life, in addition to egoistic sentiments. This was
the argument in his Principles of Psychology4. Ego-altruistic
sentiments themselves were influencing and in turn being
influenced by the conditions within and surrounding social life,
through a helical process of adaptation5. Spencer observes that
2It is doubtful whether Spencer assumes that all individuals would have identical
impressions of the community in question.
3The volumes of the Principles of Sociology form part of a series of books that
developed Spencer’s general theory of progressive “evolution”: First Principles
(1862), Principles of Biology (2 vols, 1864 and 1867), Principles of Psychology (1872),
Principles of Sociology (3 vols, 1876, 1882, and 1896, and Principles of Ethics (2
vols, 1892 and 1893). There were multiple editions of the titles. There are some
changes of substance between editions of First Principles and the first volume of
the Sociology, explained in the text.
4First published in 1855, then revised in 1872. Its influence on psychologists
including Douglas Spalding and Hughlings Jackson is discussed in Young (1970),
Rylance (2000), and Offer (2010a).
5Spencer’s mechanism of social change described in this paragraph is derived from
the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics. The focus on actions and
reactions between the community and the members by Spencer might be counted
as a forerunner of the problems associated with “central conflation” of such ideas
as agency and structure, and agency and culture, identified by Archer (1988, see too
Elder-Vass, 2010). Attempts to merge the two in Spencer’s manner appear to mean
it becomes logically impossible in reality to specify particular occasions when it is
“more” community or “more” members taking the lead in change. However, he was
attempting to refer to differing actions and reactions through time. Note too that
Spencer denied free-will in the Principles of Psychology, in all editions of the book
(Offer, 2010a, pp. 166–170).
the mere gatherings of individuals into a group does not make
them into a society: a society, “in the sociological sense, is
formed only when, besides juxtaposition there is cooperation. . . .
Cooperation, then, is at once that which cannot exist without a
society, and that for which a society exists. It may be a joining
of many strengths to effect something which the strength of no
single man can effect; or it may be an apportioning of different
activities to different persons, who severally participate in the
benefits of one another’s activities” (Spencer, 1891, p. 244; Offer,
2015)6. In whatever way a society originates, mutual dependence
replaces independence. In his first section of Principles of Ethics
(with the title “The Data of Ethics,” which had originally been
published separately in 1879) Spencer went on to add that (a)
that conduct continues to evolve through adaptation beyond
avoiding direct and indirect harm to others until “there are
spontaneous efforts to further the welfare of others” (Spencer,
1910, p. i:47), that (b) human nature will be so modified by
“social discipline,” that in the end “sympathetic pleasures will be
spontaneously pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to each
and all” (Spencer, 1910, p. i:250), and that (c) the well-being of
each individual person “is involved with the well-being of all”
(Spencer, 1910, p. i:216)7.
However, these foundational of aspects of Spencer’s sociology,
crucially our individual consciousnesses of others, did not
register with other broadly contemporary sociologists such as
Durkheim (and Tönnies, Dilthey, and Simmel) in their critical
comment on Spencer.
It seems clear, though, that Spencer’s “well-balanced” “social
self-consciousnesses,” possessed by each person, reflecting their
own circumstances and that of others around them, is other-
regarding. So Spencer’s position is a long way from “atomic
individualism,” or what Durkheim has depicted as “narrow
utilitarianism and utilitarian egoism.” It may not refer to in
Durkheim’s sense a collective entity, but then is that necessary?
It has been questioned whether Durkheim’s theoretical
premise that “a moral order—a normative infrastructure—is a
necessary pre-requisite to a division of labor’: all that is required
“is a common or complementary set of goals among various
parties, appropriate motivation, a means of communication,
and the ability to coordinate efforts” (Corning, 1982, p. 315).
A formula on these lines does not necessitate the presence of
spiritual values and human brotherhood, components of the
6Durkheim quoted the first sentence given here in the Division of Labor (2014,
p. 217). He restates that “society” and “association” must precede “cooperation”
(Durkheim enlarges on his understanding of “association” in The Rules of
Sociological Method (2013, p. 86).
7As noted the Principles of Ethics was first published in complete form in the 1890s
(by Williams and Norgate). The 1910 edition was issued by Appleton in New York
and London. This survey of Spencer’s work is not centrally concerned with his
social or moral theory as opposed to his sociological theory. Like John Stuart Mill
in his On Liberty (1859), Spencer tended to worry about the threat to social life
and freedom posed by the “tyranny of the majority” rather problems that might be
confronting “social solidarity” as such, or “social abnormality,” as was the case with
Durkheim. As has been established, however, he had his own distinctive account of
cooperation, ego-altruism, and morality in social life. It may be that publications
such as Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity, edited by Jeffries (2014), mark a
new age of interest in the general area, and certainly Spencer should be embraced
by it.
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“solidarity” which Steeman reasonably attributes to Durkheim’s
position in advance of the possibility of a division of labor
in social life. In practical terms it seems Durkheim makes
“an ontological break between the social and the individual
domain” (Meloni, 2016). To what extent Spencer himself makes
an ontological break is more difficult to determine8. However,
in fact, pace Durkheim, some weaker sense of sociality among
individuals, which we might call civility, may be all that is
required to precipitate a division of labor and interdependence.
This is Spencer’s position, and it is not recognized by Durkheim:
“Even Durkheim’s favorite utilitarian exemplar, Herbert Spencer,
had argued that social equilibrium in advanced societies
presupposed the adaptive acquisition of altruistic sentiments and
a concern for the liberty of others” (Bowring, 2015, p. 166).
Indeed, as will be commented on later, Zafirovski has noted that,
since Spencer “considers that in the absence of ‘common ends,’ no
cooperation and society would be possible, this implies a latent
normative solution to the problem of social order” (Zafirovski,
2000, p. 556).
Durkheim’s treatment of Spencer on these matters is
unreliable, but it has been allowed to stifle Spencer’s own voice.
Durkheim eliminates without comment Spencer’s own version
of “moral individualism,” elevating instead the binary contrast,
which Spencer had already transcended, between a community
or a society as a “moral community” and as a utilitarian “network
of self-interested ‘exchangists”’ (Perrin, 1995, p. 352).
Although, unlike Durkheim, Spencer did not have a concept
of a collective conscience, it would be a serious mistake to
assume that he thus confused unplanned spontaneous order
with amoral chaos. On the contrary, individuals were moral and
capable of altruism. Through freedom to adapt to circumstances,
individuals and societies were allowed to prosper because this
capacity permitted additional flexibility, cooperation, and space
for innovation in interaction (Spencer is thinking of adaptation
as shaped by the presence of other individuals or societies as well
as of thematerial or biological circumstances, Dingwall and King,
1995). To this end, Spencer had prescribed that the principal
responsibility of government was to try to ensure to all equal
liberty. In reality, this is the model of a society as catallaxy or
spontaneous order, which Spencer probably had absorbed from
the political economist Richard Whately. Whately, as I have
argued elsewhere, is an underappreciated source of influence on
Spencer (see Offer, 2010a). George Smith concluded in 1981 that
Spencer is an important writer “in the spontaneous order school
of social theory.” He added that there are similarities between
Spencer and F. A. Hayek, although Hayek “pays little attention
to Spencer’s contributions.” In Smith’s view, “Spencer’s entire
social theory may be seen as an elaboration of the spontaneous
order model.” Spencer explicated this idea more fully than his
predecessors such as “Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and others”
(1981, p. 424).
8Unlike Durkheim, in his own work Spencer makes no references to a “collective
consciousness” or a “general will.” However, he does clearly attribute causal
properties to social structures, while seeing them as mutable (as discussed in the
next section).
This type of concern with the phenomena of sociality in
Spencer is not open to rejection as exceptional in his thought.
In fact, its centrality instead points to the views of Durkheim
(and Tönnies, see Offer, 2010a, pp. 216–218; 251–252), idealist
thinkers, such as see Bernard Bosanquet (on Bosanquet and
Spencer see Offer, 2010a), and other writers, including J.A.
Hobson and Benjamin Kidd (on both Hobson and Kidd on
Spencer, see Offer, 2015), as being gravely misleading when they
present Spencer as an “atomic individualist.” The “spontaneous
efforts to further the welfare of others,” including the formation
of voluntary co-operative associations in general which serve to
express and foster fellow feeling, form, for Spencer, core aspects
within the development of social life, and thus of social evolution
(as the lengthy section on “beneficence” in his second volume of
his Principles of Ethics of 1893 amply demonstrates)9.
THE “SOCIAL ORGANISM”
By this point it might be objected that something crucial is being
omitted. Does not Spencer’s famous conception of a society as a
“social organism” cut against individualism and treat individuals
instrumentally as means to the holistic ends of “society”?We thus
need to devote some time to how Spencer understood the idea
of “society” itself. When that conception is itself examined with
care a quite different understanding emerges and the apparent
tension dissolves.
As well as pondering the nature of “societies” in the
1850s, Spencer was absorbed by the at once practical and
conceptual problem in biology over the vexed matter of
“compound individuality,” then mooted over certain organisms
(discussed more extensively than here in Offer, 2015, drawing
on Elwick, 2003, 2007). Spencer’s essay “The social organism”
(Spencer, 1860) complemented another on “The ultimate laws
of physiology” of 1857. Spencer’s original and preferred title for
the essay was “Transcendental physiology,” so when he published
later a collection of his own essays, he reverted to that title,
and that is the title used here. The essay speculated on some
hypothetical physiological structures beyond specimens already
available within anatomy laboratories. Spencer did not assimilate
any society or societies in general to any one known individual
organism or set of organisms. He was to insist again, in his
Principles of Sociology, that:
there exist no analogies between the body politic and a
living body, save those necessitated by that mutual dependence
of parts which they display in common. Though, in foregoing
chapters, sundry comparisons of social structures and functions
to structures and functions in the human body, have been made,
they have been made only because structures and functions in the
human body furnish familiar illustrations of structures in general.
The social organism, discrete instead of concrete, asymmetrical
instead of symmetrical, sensitive in all its units instead of having a
9Hiskes (1983) traces the treatment of Spencer’s idea of social individuals and
his liberal idea of community since his day, criticizing some libertarian sources,
including Robert Nozich’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), for ignoring the
altruistic attitudes and motivations of people which Spencer had described
in detail.
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single sensitive centre, is not comparable to any particular type of
individual organism, animal or vegetal (Spencer, 1876, p. 613).
The main subject of “Transcendental physiology” was on the
nature of forms of organisms and their physiologies, and their
modification by the forces associated with the exercise of
functions. Thus the essay explored, said Spencer, “sundry laws
of development and function which hold not of particular kinds
or classes of organisms, but of all organisms: laws, some of
which have not, we believe, been hitherto enunciated” (Spencer,
1857, p. 63).
Spencer’s 1857 essay itself made morphological comparisons
between social phenomena and physiological phenomena: there
were general principles of development and structure found
in organized bodies and in societies. A match between “the
broad facts of both physiology and sociology” emerged “not as
a plausible fancy, but as a scientific truth” (1857, pp. 101–102). In
Spencer’s “new” physiology, physiology and sociology will “more
or less interpret each other.” The study of how cause and effect
relations actually exist in “the social organism” may inspire the
search for kindred examples in the individual organism, yielding
explanations hitherto unavailable. Similarly, the physiologists’
understanding of growth and function may give “the clue to
certain social modifications otherwise difficult to understand.” In
Spencer’s opinion, the subject areas in question will “exchange
suggestions and confirmations; and this will be no small aid”
(1857, p. 102). No “supernatural” source was any longer required
to furnish a foundation for understanding “society,” “life,” or
“mind,” and thus a subject of sociology was possible.
However, the upshot was that one real and scene-shifting
peculiarity possessed by the “social organism” emerged: “while
in the body of an animal only a special tissue is endowed
with feeling, in a society all the members are endowed with
feeling” (1860, p. 276). The contrast pinpointed constitutes one of
absolutely fundamental importance to Spencer’s model of society
as organism: in individual bodies “the welfare of all other parts
is rightly subservient to the welfare of the nervous system.” But
this does not apply to societies. Because of the fact of individual
consciousnesses, “Corporate life in bodies-politic,” says Spencer,
“must therefore serve the lives of the parts” (Spencer, 1860, pp.
276–277). Scarcely less important was that he recognized that the
members weremobile, or “locomotive.” Spencer was not by name
mentioned in a recent theoretical study by Elder-Vass into the
causal powers of social structures. However, this particular fact
of mobility as a structural feature which, as it happened, Spencer
had identified, has surfaced again to figure with some prominence
in this new study: at least some varieties of social structures “do
not depend on spatially specific physical relations between their
parts to produce the mechanisms that give them their causal
powers.” They can be “spatially disarticulated—they can operate
in the absence of any specific set of spatial relations between their
parts” (2012, p. 200). Spencer understood this, and it seems that
he may have seen that this absence of a specific spatial relation
facilitated the membership of more than one social group, the
occurrence of intersectionality, as a consequence.
By 1860, then, the ferment of intellectual preparation
which lay behind Spencer’s particular conception of the
“social organism” had furnished him with a more robust and
interlocking set of arguments than his reputation in some
quarters as a dilettante gives him credit. A society was stipulated
to be an organism, yet with singular characteristics. Societies,
then, are “organisms” and thereby a constituent of the natural
world, but essentially sui generis in the nature and powers of
its units, structures and functions (they are therefore “super-
organisms”). For Spencer, that was sufficient to underpin his
fundamental aim of establishing a scientific sociology (Spencer,
1896, p. 315; Offer, 2015).
It has often been said that conceptions of societies as
organisms have accompanied attempts to encourage reformist
or conservative social and political arrangements, in each case
with requests for additional intervention by government. There
are, though, no necessary or “natural” connections here: parallels
between organisms and societies could be legitimately formulated
to point to no role for government save a “negatively regulative”
role. That is to say, that government should not interfere with the
exercise of someone’s liberty unless that exercise would infringe
the liberty of another to do likewise. To an article written by T.
H. Huxley Spencer replied (citing Whately again):
Far from contending for a laissez faire policy in the sense
which the phrase commonly suggests, I have contended for amore
active control of the kind distinguishable as negatively regulative.
One of the reasons I have urged for excluding State-action from
other spheres, is, that it may become more efficient within its
proper sphere (Spencer, 1871, p. 438).
This “negatively regulative” formulation is the one which Spencer
in fact adopts, reminding us that since social individuals have
social self-consciousnesses there is no social sensorium in
society. Given the richness of Spencer’s conception of individuals,
he can fuse it with an organicist (note, not mechanistic)
theory of social life, but with government occupying a limited
“proper sphere”: “the individual is not to be seen as isolated
or separate, but is rather socially situated, recognizable only
through his connections to others in the society. Spencer’s man
is not Hobbes’s man, nor is Spencer’s individualism Hobbes’s
individualism, for Spencer is resolute in his rejection of the
atomic postulate” (McCann, 2004, pp. 125–126). Both the logical
coherence of Spencer’s position and the misreading of it by many
of the criticisms made of it, have been succinctly put by Gray
(Gray, 1996, p. 233):
At the root of the critics’ misinterpretation of Spencer’s
theory was their mistaken assumptions that the ‘opposite’
of individualism was organicism, and that the ‘opposite’ of
‘organicism’ was individualism. The truth is, however, that if
there is an ‘opposite’ of individualism it is collectivism, not
organicism, and if there is an ‘opposite’ of organicism, it is
mechanism not individualism. Spencer consistently developed an
individualistic/organicist theory, and consistently opposed it to a
collectivist/mechanistic theory.
The idea of the social organism in Spencer’s hands was in
principle a stimulating integration into a single model of the
ideas of spontaneous cooperation and relatively permanent but
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mutable social structures as the bedrock for the interpretation of
society and social life10. There can be little room for doubt now
that it was indebted to his cross-disciplinary reflection on the
state-of-the-art controversies of biological science of the 1850s
arising from the apparently prolific diversity of physiological
phenomena and organic forms. Once it is accepted that it needs to
be interpreted in the context of his “transcendental physiology”
Spencer’s “social organism” is revealed, as he intended, as a
means to unifying the study of forms in all that had lived, and
a worthwhile contribution to sociology.
“MILITANCY” AND “INDUSTRIALISM”
Spencer’s categorization of social relations into two differing
types, “militant” and “industrial,” played an important part in
his sociology. The contrast provided a focus to the comparisons
and dissimilarities exhibited between various societies, while
entertaining the belief that civilized societies in the future would
resolve their differences, making for a peaceful political order
internationally. While its essence is present in 1842 in the
Letters collected together in The Proper Sphere of Government,
Spencer’s first substantial publication (Spencer, 1843, p. 23), the
first formally developed statement of the contrast came in First
Principles of 1862, when he discussed social metamorphoses
among “civilized nations,” in particular on changes “from the
military or predatory type of social structure, to the industrial
or mercantile type” (Spencer, 1862, p. 190, note social structure,
not society)11. As the old lines of organization dissolve, new ones
surface. In the first volume of the Principles of Sociology, Spencer
clarifies these militant and industrial forms in their “pure” forms
by highlighting the juxtaposed versions of co-operation they
present. He says that the co-operation “by which the life of the
militant society is maintained, is a compulsory co-operation”
(Spencer, 1877, p. 584, note that reference is now to society).
The industrial type of society displays a voluntary co-operation in
“its multiform activities” (Spencer, 1877, pp. 589–590). Spencer
qualifies how the meanings of “militant” and “industrial” are to
be understood in the second volume of the Sociology. First, it
would be false to assume that the industrially-organized society
(Spencer, 1891, p. 604).
is one in which, of necessity, much work is done. Where
the society is small, and its habitat so favorable that life may
be comfortably maintained with but little exertion, the social
relations which characterize the industrial type may co-exist with
very moderate productive activities. It is not the diligence of its
members which constitutes the society an industrial one in the
sense here intended, but the form of cooperation under which
their labors, small or great in amount, are carried on.
10When compared with other organisms, the structures and functions “of the
social organism are obviously far less specific, far more modifiable, far more
dependent on conditions that are variable and never twice alike” (Spencer, 1873,
p. 58).
11The passage is unchanged in the sixth and final edition of 1900, except by then
that “or predatory” and “or mercantile” are omitted.
In fact, Spencer’s message might have been better presented
and understood with less emphasis on “militant” and “industrial”
in the distinction, and more on the two contrasting forms
of cooperation in social relations themselves. The description
and analysis of social relations in terms of differing forms
of cooperations, whether in domestic, ceremonial, religious,
professional and moral contexts, as well as in the contexts of
political priorities and structures, were his central focus. Seen in
that light, Spencer’s contribution has more in common with the
orientation of the later distinction between “Gemeinschaft” and
“Gesellschaft” social relations proposed by Tönnies (1887) than is
usually recognized, and possibly also compared with Durkheim’s
distinction between “mechanical” and “organic” solidarity in The
Division of Labor in Society.
Spencer’s emphasis on the differences between the forms
of social relations themselves in making his militant/industrial
contrast reinforces his second important qualification about
the interpretation of the concepts “militant” and “industrial.”
He distinguishes the industrial type of society, “properly so
called,” from the type “in which the component individuals,
while exclusively occupied in production and distribution, are
under a regulation such as that advocated by socialists and
communists.” For this also involves “the principle of compulsory
cooperation,” since individuals are “prevented from competing
with one another in supplying goods for money” (Spencer, 1891,
pp. 604–605).
A little more detail is needed on the chief characteristics of
the two types of social relations. In militant social relations,
where the purposes of offense and defense are pre-eminent, the
forces of individuals have to be combined to act in concert,
whether directly or indirectly. A process of regimentation
according to status takes place in the army. Social relations
in the community at large are shaped to serve the needs of
the army. The result is that “the individual is owned by the
State. While preservation of the society is the primary end,
preservation of each member is a secondary end—an end cared
for chiefly as subserving the primary end” (1891, p. 572). Under
militancy, citizens become used to obedience and unused to
the exercise of the powers of initiation (1891, p. 602). Actions
as such are associated with obedience to the personal orders
of figures with authority. In cultural terms, this course of
life, “which makes personal causation familiar and negatives
experience of impersonal causation, produces an inability to
conceive of any social processes as carried out under self-
regulating arrangements” (1891, p. 602).
However, where the corporate action of a militant regime
ceases to be needed to protect the corporate body from the
destruction of its member individuals, industrially organized
social relations are paramount. The individual, “instead of being
sacrificed by the society, has to be defended by the society”
(1891, p. 607). Spencer means that the end which remains for
corporate action is that of “preserving the component members
of the society from destruction or injury by one another: injury,
as here interpreted, including not only immediate, but also
remote, breaches of equity” (1891, pp. 656–57). This function of
corporate agency is that of administering “justice” (1891, p. 638).
Processes in “industrial” societies are characterized as having
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org 6 February 2019 | Volume 4 | Article 1
Offer Social Solidarity and Herbert Spencer
spontaneously generated social relations which possess loose
central controls, and in which socially self-conscience private
individuals are able to pursue “decentered” ends, rather than
having a central control directing those interchanges between
private individuals toward collective normative purposes (see
Dingwall and King, 1995).
There is serious divergence in the commentary on Spencer’s
militant/industrial contrast. Whilst it is said that its importance
for Spencer’s sociology is “hard to overestimate” (Bell and Sylvest,
2006, p. 225), there is at first glance rather slender evidence
for a specific claim that the militant/industrial distinction is
a key part of Spencer’s directional theory of the evolution of
societies, although this is often made. There seem to be only
three occasions on which, on the face of it, Spencer might be in
this position.
In the Principles of Society, he referred to “the communal
proprietorship of land.” This, Spencer says, was “partially or
wholly merged in the ownership of dominant men during
evolution of the militant type,” and he then adds that communal
proprietorship “will be resumed as the industrial type becomes
fully evolved” (1891, p. 556 emphasis added)12.
In the same book, again with the rather distant future in
mind, he suggested that, just as the difference between militancy
and industrialism is shown by the substitution of the belief that
individuals exist for the benefit of the State for the belief that the
State exists for the benefit of individuals; so the contrast between
the industrial type and the type likely to be evolved from it, is
shown by the substitution of the belief that life is for work for
the belief that work is for life (1877, pp. 595–596)13.
Finally, in The Man vs. The State, Spencer claimed that at
every stage of social evolution “there must exist substantial
agreement between practices and beliefs—real beliefs I mean,
not nominal ones” (Spencer, 1884, p. 170). Thus the pathway
to the fully developed industrial type had to involve experience
of the discipline and the customary hierarchical order which
was generated through the application “in long ages” under “the
militant type,” and also “the willingness to act under direction
(now no longer coercive but agreed to under contract)” (Spencer,
1884, p. 172)14.
Notice, though, that on these particular occasions Spencer is
indeed referring to changes generated “in long ages.” Naturally,
in the long run it was the case that nothing was exempted from
evolutionary change in Spencer’s theoretical perspective. In that
specific sense the militant/industrial contrast itself could cease to
12In Social Statics, dated 1851 but published late in 1850 according to Spencer,
Spencer had supported land nationalization, but now he regarded this support as
premature, given that industrial social relations were not yet firmly established. The
American social critic, journalist, and political economist Henry George, angered
by the change, publicly criticized Spencer for backsliding in 1892 in Herbert
Spencer: A Perplexed Philosopher (see Paul, 1982).
13These claims survive in the 1893 edition of the first volume, at p. 563.
14In similar vein, in the third volume of the Sociology of 1896 Spencer writes that,
as fast as society advances, “and especially as fast as the militant type yields place to
the industrial type, a centralized and coercive control, political and ecclesiastical,
becomes less needful, and plays a continually decreasing part in social evolution;
yet the evidence compels us to admit that at first it was indispensable” (Spencer,
1896, p. 310).
possess salience in a world that had transcended it. I will return
to this point later.
However, when he ordinarily used the contrast it was in the
context of a relatively compressed time scale (say the last 2000
years or so). The fundamental use of the militant/industrial
contrast was to simply isolate and capture patterns of similarity
and difference over how cooperation in particular occurred in the
social life, within and between societies.
Hence in the Principles of Sociology, Spencer announced that
societies may be grouped into “the predominantly militant and
the predominantly industrial—those in which the organization
for offense and defense is most largely developed, and those
in which the sustaining organization is most largely developed”
(Spencer, 1877, p. 570). This division flags up the kinds of
social activity which have preponderance at a particular time
and place, and the resulting contrasts in the organization
possessed by the society in question. When coercion or
compulsion is behind cooperation, by class or status, contrasts
with voluntary cooperation, and contract (Spencer uses these
concepts, attributing them rightly to Sir Henry Maine, Spencer,
1896, p. 484)15.
Again, in The Study of Sociology, he referred to the changes
in the structure of a society specifically associated with any
alteration “in the ratio of the predatory to the industrial activities”
(1873, p. 347). Moreover, when Spencer composed his mature
statement of the militant/industrial contrast, in the “Political
Institutions” section of the Principles of Sociology, he says that,
during “social evolution,” “there has habitually been a mingling
of the two” (1891, p. 568).
Note too that traffic between the two is not one way. There
are transformations “of the militant into the industrial and the
industrial into the militant.” As it happens, since Spencer’s own
sympathies were unequivocally with the voluntary cooperation
of the industrial type, which was under pressure, he felt, by the
1870s, he wrote mostly on how the industrial type “retrogrades
toward themilitant type if international conflicts recur” (Spencer,
1877, p. 600).
So how best should the militant/industrial contrast be
interpreted? Wiltshire insists that Spencer’s scheme of social
evolution possessed definite stages, with progress “from the
‘militant’ to the ‘industrial’ type of society.” Spencer, claims
Wiltshire, rejected the possibility that a society could exhibit
characteristics of both types at the same time for the reason that
the “‘industrial’ type is the ‘perfect’ state”’ (Wiltshire, 1978, p.
247). However, Spencer’s own words, as we have seen, convey the
opposite message, with the two types “mingling.” The entry in
the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography on Spencer by Jose
Harris is ambushed on the same grounds: the premise of his social
theory was that “industrialization and militarism were mutually
exclusive” (she adds that, with absurdlymisplaced condescension,
“the most cursory glance at the history of nineteenth-century
Europe and America might have suggested otherwise).”
Weinstein has interpreted Spencer’s types in the context
of four phases of sequential “development” in political
15In this general context, though, it is perhaps clearer to refer to “types of social
relations” rather than “types of society.”
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history: “(1) primitive societies characterized by informal
political cooperation, (2) ‘militant’ societies dominated by
regimented, centralized political authority, (3) ‘industrial’
societies distinguished by the relaxation of centralized political
authority and the emergence of liberal values and, finally, (4)
liberal utopias where government withers away” (Weinstein,
1998, p. 16). Spencer expresses hopes for a future liberal utopia,
but otherwise Weinstein’s “phases” move well beyond Spencer’s
own words. Wiltshire, Harris and Weinstein have regrettably
overlooked that Spencer was clear that “advanced societies” of
his time were of a “semi-militant semi-industrial type” (Spencer,
1884, p. 170; Offer, 1994)16.
Turner has a different reading of Spencer on the militant
and industrial types, declaring that the distinction is not an
evolutionary classification, as has been argued. It is, rather, “a
way to fine-tune the description of a society, whatever its stage
of evolutionary development” (Turner, 1985, p. 93). Spencer,
Turner observes, recognized that political centralization “is a
fact of social life in all types of systems, from very simple
to complex ones” and that “industrial” denotes “the degree to
which operative and distributive processes are free from extensive
political regulation” (Turner, 1985, p. 79).
This interpretation does aid our understanding of how
Spencer applied the concepts to depict the kind of balances
inherent in how social life is actually conducted in a particular
society and at a particular historical moment. Turner, though,
over-simplifies the point, as I will try to explain. There is
a definite change of mood between the first volume of the
Sociology of 1876, when Spencer makes a bold directional claim
for his theory of social evolution, referring to “that state of
permanent peace to which civilization is tending” (Spencer,
1893, p. 588), and the third volume of 1896 wherein caution
is in the ascendancy, as he warns that “social progress is not
linear but divergent and re-divergent” (Spencer, 1896, p. 325).
However, the ultimate evolutionary trend toward the elimination
of militancy is not withdrawn. This observation and the other
observations on Spencer’s directional theory of the evolution
of societies and militancy raised earlier in this section leave a
problem for Turner.
Moreover, according to Spencer there is also another angle
fromwhich the militant/industrial division becomes infused with
evolutionary dimensions, given his theory. It should be noted that
when explaining in First Principles the part of his general theory
of evolution which Spencer calls the “rhythm ofmotion,” he refers
to the nature of antagonism between one society and another:
this antagonism results “not in an uniform motion, but in
an intermittent one. War, exhaustion, recoil—peace, prosperity,
and renewed aggression:—see here the alternation more or less
discernible in the military activities of both savage and civilized
nations. And irregular as is this rhythm, it is not more so than
the different sizes of the societies, and the extremely involved
causes of variation in their strengths, would lead us to anticipate”
16A description Spencer repeated in 1896 (Spencer, 1896, p. 542), made in
connection with his conditional and favorable observation that trade unions can
prevent employers doing unjust things to wages paid.
(Spencer, 1862, p. 330)17. Thus this additional aspect to how
Spencer’s theory of social evolution is actually applied to social
life is a further problem for Turner’s reading of Spencer.
As we have already stated, Spencer’s position is that once
“a combination of men acquires some permanence, there begin
actions and reactions” between the community and eachmember
of it, such that “either affects the nature of the other” (Spencer,
1877, pp. 12–13). Thus the phenomena which the concepts
“militant” and “industrial” signify cannot but be bound up
with the actions and reactions with the community, other
societies and nature in general to which Spencer had referred.
But there was nothing that implied that Spencer had reified
“the militant” and “the industrial” themselves into direct and
linearly operative “agents” in his theory of evolution. As Turner
says, the militant/industrial classification is not an “evolutionary
classification” in the sense of being an integral component of
Spencer’s theory of evolution as such. It was also, as Turner
says, a way “to fine-tune” descriptions of societies, or of parts
of them. However, what Turner’s reading does not bring out,
but is true for Spencer, is, first, that what the ideas of “militant
social relations” and “industrial social relations” will substantively
cover will in fact change during the processes of adaptation to
surrounding conditions associated with social evolution (taken to
include the effects of the “rhythm of motion”), and second, that
social evolution itself as a process, as conceptualized by Spencer,
could make the whole idea of militant social relations redundant
in due course18.
CONCLUSION
By looking afresh at what Spencer himself said about
“individuals” in (a) the context of their possession of a
“social self-consciousness,” (b) their uniquely privileged status
in Spencer’s own bespoke concept of the “social organism,”
and (c) in industrial (and militant) social relations, this article
has tried to shed new light on key aspects of his sociology and
retrieve a sense of its relevance to some contemporary theoretical
issues. As mentioned at the start, this article has not been
intended to address questions such as the precise nature of his
views on the mechanisms and direction of “evolution” and the
inappropriateness of labeling him a “social Darwinist19.”
Sociology bulks large in Spencer’s output, but he was also
contributing to biology and very significantly to psychology in
17In the 1867 edition this passage is at p. 267. On this point Spencer was open to
the charge that his law of evolution risked becoming an empty cliché.
18Thus while I agree with the basic claim by Dingwall and King (1995) that there
is ambiguity in Spencer as to whether he regards the relationship between these
two ideal types of “militant” and “industrial” “societies as evolutionary,” I here add
substantiating grounds for the claim.
19Not least because Spencer is a pre-Darwinian thinker in the sense that he
presumes design is the world in his theory of general and progressive evolution,
whereas Darwin’s theory of natural selection (variations combined with a struggle
for existence) in the Origin of Species did not. In the Principles of Biology
of 1864 Spencer presented Darwin’s natural selection as the “survival of the
fittest,” although the two expressions were not given identical meanings. Spencer
continued to believe in the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics as
a mechanism of change, though he also used from time to time thereafter the
“survival of the fittest” (see Offer, 2014).
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particular, extending its horizons in the direction of a more
developmental associationism (this work on both subjects is
mostly neglected by sociologists, but according to the topics
reviewed here, the relevant aspects were indicated). And although
in the strict logic of the topic coverage of his ten-volume
System of Synthetic Philosophy sociology was not “special” to
Spencer, in practice it was outstandingly special, no less so than
for Durkheim.
The distinguished sociologist Alvin Gouldner once reminded
us of the value of knowing the true history of our subject: “A
science ignorant of its founders does not know how far it has
traveled nor in what direction” (Gouldner, 1973, p. 370). So what
does this exercise in catching up tell us?
First a few cautionary remarks are needed. We have seen that
although there is no firm evidence that Hayek was influenced by
Spencer, it has quite often been observed, especially of the areas of
Spencer’s thought discussed in this article, that there is a palpable
affinity (Smith, 1981; McCann, 2004)20. However, ideas such as
“social self-consciousness” need not be confined to serving an
explicitly political “neo-liberal” approach to sociology. In this
respect, there are also affinities with rational action theories such
as that of Coleman (1990), but Spencer differs in stressing a
social normativity which has been developing through time in an
increasingly “thick” way. There is too a selectionist approach in
sociology, applying and adapting the Darwinian theory of natural
selection to the task of explaining actual outcomes in social life.
The fact that a person, government or culture intends something
to occur does not trump the selective process: the cause alone
cannot determine the outcome, the outcome has to “fit” with
the selective environment (see Runciman, 1997 and Offer, 2010b
on the theory, Room, 2011; Vollmer, 2013 for applications).
However, the substantial differences in theory between Darwin
and Spencer seem to pose at least for now an obstacle to any
revival of interest in Spencer in that selectionist approach.
More promising for the present is to see Spencer not as
a neglected member of a recent theoretical “school,” but as a
resource through which we look afresh at our understanding of
the ontological orientations of “the social” available to sociology.
With this point in mind, when the idea of the social
organism was discussed reference was made to Elder-Vass’s
study The Causal Powers of Social Structure: Emergence,
Structure and Agency. That reference made a real but perhaps
unexpected connection between an important contribution to
new perspectives on the concept of structure on the one hand and
Spencer’s recognition that individuals were mobile within “the
social organism” on the other. However, the idea of a dormant but
potentially fruitful link could be developed further. For Spencer
himself illustrated what Elder-Vass has recently described as the
social power of a “normative circle” in thinking about social
structure. The members of such a circle form a structural entity
at work in an area of social life which causes, in part, an outcome
which the commitment to endorse and enforce practices with
20Gane deals with Hayek’s criticisms of Comte and Durkheim, but does not
comment on how often Hayek, unawares, is echoing Spencer on spontaneous
cooperation, and on altruism, which is not to be identified with “solidarity” in the
sense of a holistic unitedness associated with Durkheim (Gane, 2014, p. 1101).
each other “makes a norm circle more effective than the sum
of its members would be if they were not part of it” (Elder-
Vass, 2010, p. 123). Given that one of Spencer’s concerns is with
how governments, and everyday habits and fashions, could serve
to channel the exercise of liberty in a myopic manner, he gives
us a period gem of an instance in his Principles of Psychology:
“Consider how difficult it would be to get a lady to wheel a
costermonger’s barrow down Regent-street, and how easily she
may be led to say a malicious thing about some lady she is jealous
of—contrast the intense repugnance to the one act, which is not
in itself reprehensible, with the feeble repugnance to the other
act, which is itself reprehensible; and then infer how great is the
evolution of the moral sentiments yet required to bring human
nature into complete fitness for the social state” (Spencer, 1881,
p. ii:606). In this case we may say that the normative circle has
a view of “the normally expected attitudes and behavior of ladies
who are members of a certain social standing.”
Elder-Vass’s study also distinguished emergent properties from
resultant properties, again relevant to the case of Spencer. There
is general agreement that Durkheim thought in emergentist
terms about “the social,” and its ability to be a causal force, in
the sense that what is called “the social” has properties over and
above the parts composing it (the component individuals). The
contrast with resultant properties points to properties of a whole
“that are possessed by its parts in isolation, or in an unstructured
aggregation” (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 17). Now as it happens, when
this contrast has been deployed in sociological analysis, Spencer
has tended to be labeled a resultant theorist insofar as “the
social” is concerned. In Ingold’s opinion, for example, “Spencer’s
society was a resultant, not an emergent, containing nothing
that was not already prefigured in the properties of its original
constituents” (Ingold, 1986, p. 224). His verdict though does not
take into account the possession and application in social life of
“social self-consciousness” by Spencer’s individuals, which was
discussed earlier in this article. That social self-consciousness
itself was and is engendered by social life. The nature of it will
vary according to the perceptions held by the members of the
society in question of the relevant strength and weakness of
what Spencer called “militancy” and “industrialism” in the social
relations of the society. We thus seem to be faced with social life
for Spencer as an emergent rather than a resultant property. This
would matter even if Spencer was to be seen simply of historical
interest in sociology. But it is of larger and enduring significance:
it goes some way to stymie attempts to disregard Spencer as a
serious sociological theorist, and one who still has original and
stimulating ideas on sociality, solidarity, individualism and social
structure to share.
If we take a broader perspective, we ought to remember
that, with Spencer assuming no more than “common ends” and
“shared conventions” as underlying cooperation in individual
behavior, in contrast with Durkheim, it can be argued that we
come to a point of convergence which meets with “Durkheim,
Parsons, and other holists emphasizing the role of ‘normative
consensus”’ (Zafirovski, 2000, p. 560). Normative convergence:
between the sociological individualism of Spencer–Hayek–Mises
and Durkheim–Parsons’ holistic sociology only confounds the
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paradox of the latter’s claim of independence and irrelevance of
Spencer for his ‘action theory’.... In any event, all these otherwise
divergent theorists have been shown to converge, albeit in varying
degrees, upon a certain point: the status of social norms, values
and institutions (Zafirovski, 2000, p. 573).
Indeed it should be noted that in “Two ontological orientations
in sociology,” Karakayali (2015) has assessed the place of Spencer
not only in the context of that article’s title, but with a discussion
also of his associated commitment to locating “the social”
alongside the organic sphere. That aspect itself, in a wider kind
of way, is attracting attention, with a pragmatic and porous
rather than inflexible ontological relationship being advocated
between the “biological” and the “social,” leaving behind perhaps
the nature/nurture dichotomy (Meloni, 2014).
Spencer did not as a matter of principle ring-fence sociology
from psychology and biology. This article has discussed his
distinctive, stimulating and challenging understanding of how
best to interpret “the social” and “society.” His breadth of
openness toward the sources which yielded his novel insights
into these and associated concepts may well strike us now, not
as alien and quaint or as a “spent force,” but as surprisingly
prescient. In short, at this level of theoretical work, Spencer,
properly understood, should still prove instructive.
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